When the varroa mite was first detected in Australia in 2022, many outside the beekeeping and horticultural industries viewed it as a nuisance—a distant problem for a few farmers. This was dangerously naive.

In breaching our perimeter, the varroa mite has created a strategic vulnerability. The mite, which attacks bees, reminds us that Australia’s island geography no longer shields us from biosecurity threats.

Biosecurity is a foundation of our food security. As ASPI analysts have consistently argued, food security is an indispensable part of national security. Penetration of our defenses by a threat like the varroa mite can destabilise markets and the very resilience and prosperity of rural and regional Australia. A nation unable to reliably feed itself faces diminished strategic power and internal fissures that can be exploited in an era of heightened competition.

A recent Rabobank report, ‘How varroa mites might impact Australian pollinators’, chillingly analyses this strategic exposure. It details how pollination demand has tripled since 1990, while commercially managed beehives have stagnated. The number of available pollinators is dangerously close to the minimum required to sustain key food production industries.

This is where the varroa mite incursion, which we’re no longer trying to eradicate, becomes a national security consideration. Rabobank’s analysis highlights that countries such as New Zealand and Canada experienced an approximate 8 percent decline in hive numbers within four to five years of varroa mite outbreaks. Modelling indicates pollination in Australia could fall substantially below demand within three to five years. The Australian Honeybee Industry Council has already warned of a national bee shortage for the vital almond pollination season.

The incursion has far-reaching consequences. Increased beekeeping costs, driven by the varroa mite, raise pollination fees, squeezing producer margins and undermining regional economies. Declining pollination leads to domestic food shortages, price volatility and potentially social unrest.

Such biosecurity failures are a tax on national bandwidth and increase pressure on agricultural industries that already provide substantial cash investments, often via unmatched biosecurity levies.

The varroa mite exposes a strategic blind spot where defence and security policy has not adequately integrated agricultural biosecurity. We cannot rely solely on our geography. Biosecurity must be treated as a multi-layered, whole-of-nation framework, continuously updated, exercised and funded as earnestly as military capabilities.

As the National Defence Strategy makes clear, national defence is a coordinated, whole-of-nation approach, harnessing all aspects of our national power, including economic resilience and secure supply chains. In a world where adversaries probe weak seams, resilient food systems deter as effectively as ships, planes and satellites. We must move beyond viewing biosecurity as solely an agriculture problem for farm gates, border checkpoints, or the chiefs of biosecurity alone.

The path forward requires a fundamental mindset shift, elevating biosecurity to a core national defence function. This could start with establishing national command and accountability, perhaps through a standing National Biosecurity Coordination Council in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and chaired at deputy-secretary level. It could drive the National Biosecurity Strategy’s implementation, whereas past review recommendations remain largely unfulfilled.

We must also build an improved sovereign detection and rapid-response capability with high-throughput genomic sequencing at ports and hubs, deploying on-farm diagnostics and standing up surge teams with sufficient authority. Speed is paramount, so approvals, indemnities, and compensation triggers must be templated in peacetime.

Furthermore, we must diversify pollination sources and harden supply chains. Treating pollination as critical infrastructure means supporting managed hives, incentivising backup providers and accelerating research into complementary pollinators. Major horticulture producers should maintain robust pollination contingency plans.

A critical opportunity lies in biologicals and biotechnology. We need to embrace next-generation tools, such as biological controls and genetic sequencing for rapid threat identification, and genetic engineering for innate resistance. While state and territory scientists are talented, their work often faces inconsistent funding. Research and development corporations with substantial, publicly matched budgets could strategically invest in biosecurity to avoid fragmented outcomes.

Such investments will enhance protection and develop sovereign industrial capability for long-term resilience. The long-term cost of inaction would far outweigh the upfront investment. This is a strategic calculation. We need to build these capabilities at home rather than relying solely on international partners.

We should also align incentives and compliance, making it easier to do the right thing and enforcing consistency. Public money should buy down risk, not subsidise its persistence. Finally, we should conduct regular national biosecurity wargames with realistic features, such as labour shortages, cross-border movement, supply chain disruption and misinformation. Current crisis exercises, such as Ex Convergence, are useful, but industry and states should not have to push for inclusion. We should publish exercise debriefs. We should do for pests and pathogens what we do for fires and floods.

The varroa mite has breached our perimeter and its full impact is yet to be realised. This could be a moment of truth for our national resilience. We cannot afford complacency. A national biosecurity strategy, modelled with the same rigour as national defence planning, is an imperative. Australia’s food security and our national defence depends on it.

 

Written by: Andrew Henderson 19 Aug 2025, re-published with permission from Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Bee sting: the varroa-mite incursion is a biosecurity warning | The Strategist

 

 

Andrew Henderson is the principal of Agsecure and a senior fellow at ASPI.